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World War Web: Rethinking
“Aiding and Abetting” in the
Social Media Age
Rebecca J. Cambron *
ISIS’s use of social media presents a new challenge for
counterterror efforts. The organization aims to recruit followers
and incite violence through social media. Given that this is a
new medium for terrorist organizations, social media companies
have come under fire for indirectly providing ISIS with farreaching platforms to spread its content. The companies, as well
as national governments and international entities, have
attempted to respond to the threat posed by such content. These
responses, however, have proven ineffective. This Note argues
that to effectively respond to and combat the threat posed by
terrorist speech, national governments should adopt a new
approach—an approach which holds social media companies
responsible for aiding and abetting terrorist speech inciting
violence. Identifying the specific threat as stemming from
terrorist speech recruiting for or directly inciting violence
narrows the scope of social media companies’ potential liability.
Additionally, the use of INTERPOL’s existing informationsharing systems provides a means of maintaining a “bird’s eye
view” of terrorism’s trends, while its National Central Bureaus
provide nation-specific notifications of terrorist speech.
Subsequently, national law enforcement should impose the aiding
and abetting standard on social media companies that fail to
remove the content identified by INTERPOL. Through this
blend of international and national enforcement, freedom of
expression receives protection through the limited scope of
liability while moving towards improved national and global
security.
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I.

Introduction

The world has changed significantly since it first came in contact
with those who orchestrated the bombing of the World Trade Center
in September 2001. While many have used terrorism as a tactic to
achieve their political or religious ends, al-Qaeda blazed a new trail.
Fast-forward to today, the non-state actor birthed by al-Qaeda
presents a host of new challenges to the national security community.
Unlike those who have relied on terrorism before, the non-state actor
has no formal government which the U.N. or national governments
may sanction. 1 Fluid boundaries make precise counterattacks
challenging. 2 Government must now launch wars against groups few
have heard of, lacking a definition of who or what it can declare war
against. 3
The traditional understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism
tactics no longer provides an adequate response to the threat posed

1.

See NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NONSTATE ACTORS: IMPACT ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1
(2007), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nonstate_actors_2007.pdf
(discussing impact of non-state actors in international law).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.
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by non-state terrorist organizations, like ISIS and al-Qaeda. 4 The
characteristics of their groups alone posed a challenge to the defense
and intelligence communities following 9/11. 5 But an additional
complication emerged in the early 2000s: society changed. Following
the increased use of the internet, the rise of social media platforms
catalyzed non-state actors’ abilities to spread their message. 6 Social
media effectively eliminated organization costs, allowing terrorist
groups to easily create a global, structured threat.
The confluence of non-state terrorist organizations and social
media generates a host of new challenges for combatting terrorism.
ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, IS, Daesh, or ISIL, 7 exemplifies
how terrorist organizations may use social media companies’ platforms
in the future. Viewing the online, social-media world as a new
“theater of war” for terrorism requires experts, policy makers, and
those tasked with combatting terrorism to think differently about
counterterrorism methods. 8 More fundamentally, however, it forces
them to prioritize the value judgments they make in creating policies
and strategies.
Those combatting terrorism have attempted to reduce the threat
through a variety of methods. 9 But the threat persists. This Note
argues that to address the new challenges, national governments
should hold social media companies responsible for aiding and
abetting terrorist speech used to recruit for and incite violence
through an international standard. Relying on the foundation laid in
customary international law for complicity-based liability, national
jurisdictions can impose responsibility when social media companies
facilitate terrorist speech by permitting the speech to remain on the
platforms. A limited definition of “terrorist speech” based on the type
of content and the terrorist organization posting it aids in limiting the
4.

See id. (commenting that non-state actors, such as terrorists, challenge
governments and are using new technology).

5.

Id.

6.

See generally Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend Social Media as
Information Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 50 (2017).

7.

Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One Group, Many Names, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east27994277 [https://perma.cc/KA9P-AF2Y].

8.

9/11 Memorial & Museum, The Future of the Jihadist
(Apr.
18,
2017),
https://www.youtube.
Threat, YOUTUBE
com/watch?v=c3hyU16oGjU [https://perma.cc/T6HG-7VLG].

9.

See David Patrikarakos, Social Media Networks Are the Handmaiden to
(Nov.
2,
2017),
Dangerous
Propaganda,
TIME
http://time.com/5008076/nyc-terror-attack-isis-facebook-russia/
[https://perma.cc/VU3G-JBTD] (noting the inadequacies of current
responses by the U.S. government and social media companies).
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scope of liability. Within the limited scope, INTERPOL and national
judicial systems may combine efforts to effectively address the new
threat to global security.
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of terrorist
organizations’ current use of social media and the short-sighted and
patchwork responses from social media companies, national
governments, and international entities. It will identify key obstacles
to effective responses and potential ways to overcome them.
Subsequently, Part II will argue that a more effective solution can
come from holding social media companies responsible for aiding and
abetting the terrorist organizations under a system of joint
enforcement by national jurisdictions and INTERPOL. Part II will
also define the scope of liability based on a limited definition of
“terrorist speech” and how the presence of such speech on social
media platforms constitutes aiding and abetting. Using this definition
to limit the scope of enforcement, Part II will continue by describing
the system of implementation through both INTERPOL’s monitoring
and notification processes, and national governments’ law
enforcement. This collaborative system of operation ensures the most
responsive means of addressing developments in terrorist speech.
Should companies fail to remove the content after notification,
national law enforcement and judiciaries may step in and prosecute
under the international standard. Lastly, Part III concludes that
imposing responsibility does not undermine free speech or national
sovereignty, but instead utilizes a narrow definition of “terrorist
speech,” restricting a limited form of communication connected to
violent actions of national concern. In such a manner, joint
implementation simultaneously respects national sovereignty and
individual rights while combating the global threat posed by terrorist
speech on social media.

II. ISIS’s Development and Established Use of Social
Media Has Yet To Be Effectively Countered By
Social Media Companies or Government Entities.
Social media companies and governments have struggled in their
counterterrorism efforts to appropriately respond to the nature of the
threat posed by terrorist speech on social media. With the birth and
subsequent proliferation of social media into everyday life, the Islamic
State discovered a global medium for its message. 10 The example set
by ISIS for future terrorist organizations creates a new challenge for
countering such organizations’ behavior. 11 Responses by the platform’s
10.

William McCants, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, STRATEGY,
DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 5 (2015).

11.

The Brookings Institution, Panel, Al-Qaida, The Islamic State, and the
Future of the Global Jihadi Movement: A Conversation with
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companies and governments inadequately address terrorism-related
content that incites violence or participation in violence; ignoring the
inevitable development of terrorist tactics requires more long-term,
systematic solutions. 12
A.

Fueled by its Ideology, ISIS Melds its Religious Zealotry with Social
Media to Facilitate its Ideological and Political Goals

The new world created by social media transformed not only the
way regular individuals engage with each other, but also opened up a
new means of communication exploitable by non-state terrorist
organizations. Social media’s growth during the early 2000s coincided
with the rise of a new ideological strand of Islamic jihadist
teachings—teachings which formed ISIS’s foundation. 13 This collision
of events enabled ISIS to use social media to advance its ideological
goals more effectively and directly than its predecessors. 14 Despite
ISIS and al-Qaeda sharing a similar desire for the creation of a
caliphate, a nation-state based on Islamic laws, 15 the two
organizations varied in how to achieve their political goals. 16 These
different strategies condense into a disagreement as to how much
support for their political ends each organization seeks from the
Muslim world. 17 Al-Qaeda believes in the necessity of “winning the
hearts and minds” of local Arab tribes, recalling the Prophet
Muhammed’s uniting of tribal factions in creating his Islamic state.18
ISIS, on the other hand, does not require support from the Muslim
community in the Middle East. 19 20
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow 4-6 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/20150916_alqaeda_isis_jihad_transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG7S-GDLA].
12.

See id. at 6-7 (noting the continuous analysis of the threat posed by
Islamic extremism and the need for constant re-assessment).

13.

9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 6.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

McCants, supra note 10, at 56-7.

19.

9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8.

20.

Though both ascribing to the teachings of Muhammad, ISIS and alQaeda have developed into two different strands of Islam, much like
differing protestant denominations. Despite sharing a desire to create a
caliphate the two organizations varied in three major aspects: (1)
strategies for achieving caliphates, (2) the timing of when to establish a
caliphate, and (3) the interpretation of the end times. The strategies for
achieving a caliphate reflect each “denomination’s” reliance on Muslim
tribes. Al-Qaeda reflects back on Muhammad’s actions and believe in
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These differing viewpoints on the role of the Muslim community
directly influence the willingness of each organization to use violence
in order to achieve their political objectives. 21 Because it has no need
for support from the Muslim community and therefore openly uses
violence against those within its geographic control, ISIS turns to and
relies on foreign fighters and international terror attacks to bolster
recruitment and keep it in the minds of the public and other
jihadists. 22 The Guardian’s series The Raqqa Diaries recounts life
inside the ISIS-held city. 23 A young man writes of how ISIS first came
through the city in March 2013 saying:
They took advantage of our confusion and ignorance. . .. At
first they would charm people with a softly spoken manner,
promising them the world. . .. Those who actually believe they
have come to save us were the first to enter the city; the second
are much more violent. 24

This approach contrasts with the concern al-Qaeda had with
maintaining the support of those under their political control, as Bin
Laden counseled members to avoid killing any other Muslims so as to
not alienate the community. 25 Because they can use violence against
the Muslim community, social media plays a valuable role in building
support for ISIS outside of the Middle East. By giving ISIS a way of
shaping its image, social media helps the organization hide the reality
experienced in Raqqa and other cities and maintain an online
presence. 26 International attention—and social media as a means of

the need to create a “greater religious identity” within all of the Muslim
world. Thus, al-Qaeda hesitates to take actions which may alienate
other Muslims. ISIS, on the other hand, does not believe this “greater
identity” is required, leaving it free to be more forceful and violent
against Muslims in the Middle East as it seeks to establish a new
caliphate. See 9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 6 and McCants,
supra note 8 for Dr. McCant’s further explanation of the intellectual
development of ISIS from al-Qaeda.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Mike Thomson, The Raqqa Diaries: Life Under Isis Rule, The Observer,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
26,
2017,
5:00
AM),
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/feb/26/the-raqqa-diaries-lifeunder-isis-rule-samer-mike-thomson-syria
[https://perma.cc/WG4KY77Z].

24.

Id.

25.

McCants, supra note 10, at 53.

26.

See 9/11 Museum & Memorial, supra note 8 (noting the need for both
propaganda and public attention).
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it—therefore plays a key role in fulfilling the ideological basis for
ISIS’s mission. 27
B. Current Responses by Social Media Companies and Government
Entities Fail to Appreciate the Long-Term, Global Threat Posed By the
Combination of Social Media and ISIS.

Fully addressing the presence of ISIS and its related content on
social media has proved a challenge on two fronts, namely, (1) in
undermining why terrorists use social media platforms and (2) in
constructing adequate and effective responses to that use. Social
media provides a particularly attractive means for ISIS to promote its
ideology through its global influence, accessibility, and evolving
nature. 28 These uses, in turn, generate problems for creating effective
responses by those seeking to prevent the spread of terrorism. 29
Current methods failed to adequately address the long-term, global
threat with the limited resources devoted to counterterrorism efforts.
1.

Social Media Platforms Create an Attractive Environment for ISIS
to Spread its Content.

The environment formed by the internet and social media
platforms benefits terrorist operations like ISIS. As discussed above,
ISIS’s ideological background creates a need for international
attention. 30 The internet’s global reach provides a stage for ISIS to
make its call for violence, amplified through social media’s increasing
number of users. 31 The ease at which those related to or expressing
support for the organization can create social media accounts, create
multiple accounts, or re-create accounts, even if banned, fashions an
environment encouraging to the spread of harmful messages. 32 This
ease of access, in combination with the evolving nature of the
27.

Id.

28.

See Patrikarakos, supra note 9 (noting the ease of access, popularity and
inadequate responses incentivizing ISIS’s use of social media for
propaganda).

29.

See Olivia Solon, Counter-Terrorism Was Never Meant to be Silicon
Valley’s Job. Is That Why it’s Failing?, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 29, 2017,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/29/silicon-valleycounter-terrorism-facebook-twitter-youtube-google
[https://perma.cc/H8MQ-C8VF] (outlining the methods and challenges
private companies face in countering terrorism propaganda on social
media).

30.

9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8.

31.

Patrikarakos, supra note 9.

32.

Rory Cellan-Jones, Can Internet Companies Monitor Terrorists?, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30208602
[https://perma.cc/E2W3-4XGZ].
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internet, facilitates the spread of terrorist speech, unrestricted by the
most popular social media sites.
i.
Social Media Platform’s Global Reach Attracts Terrorist
Organizations Seeking to Spread Their Message and Shape Their
Perception In the World.

Social media’s global influence provides an attractive avenue for
ISIS to facilitate their ideological goals. Foreign terrorist fighters flock
from over 100 countries to fight with ISIS, al-Qaeda, or an affiliate.33
Sally Jones, from the United Kingdom, was one such fighter. 34 Jones
went to Syria to marry an ISIS member and became active in the
recruitment of other young girls to become “jihadi brides” and marry
other ISIS members. 35 Twenty Twitter accounts linked to her
information expressed support for ISIS. 36 Recruitment to the Middle
East, however, is only part of the global influence ISIS wields. 37 The
call issued by clerics and Islamist leaders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Osama Bin Laden incited violence
across the globe. 38 In questioning how the Boston Marathon Bombing
by the Tsarnaev brothers came about, investigators found jihadist
writings, al-Qaeda propaganda, as well as YouTube videos of speeches
by radical clerics on one of the brother’s computers. 39 Similarly, in
December 2017, a U.S. district court sentenced a Massachusetts man
to 28 years in prison for supporting ISIS and using a Twitter page for
the “Lions of America” to call on his followers to kill Americans. 40
33.

9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8.

34.

Tara John, Sally Jones, The ISIS ‘White Widow’, Believed Killed in
Syria, TIME (Oct. 12, 2017), http://time.com/4979268/sally-jones-isiswhite-widow/ [https://perma.cc/2PVM-ZS45].

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

See Ann O’Neill, The 13th Juror: The Radicalization of Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev,
CNN
(Mar.
30,
2015,
4:17
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev-13th-juror-jaharradicalization/index.html [https://perma. cc/UY5B-EYZQ] (noting the
radicalization of US immigrants through social media).

38.

Scott Shane, Zarqawi Built Global Jihadist Network on Internet, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
9,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/world/middleeast/09web.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4K2-RJBT].

39.

O’Neill, supra note 37.

40.

Office of Public Affairs, Massachusetts Man Sentenced to 28 Years in
Prison for Supporting ISIS and Conspiring to Murder U.S. Citizens,
OF
JUSTICE
(Dec.
19,
2017),
DEP’T
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/massachusetts-man-sentenced-28-yearsprison-supporting-isis-and-conspiring-murder-us-citizens
[https://perma.cc/DU5A-HSXA].
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These incidents demonstrate the role of social media as a global
resource—facilitating terrorist activity by publishing content for
incitement and recruitment for violent actions. 41 Far beyond the
physical presence of ISIS in the Middle East, social media serves to
magnify ISIS’s ideology.
ii. The Ease of Access Many Social Media Platforms Have Creates a
Unique Environment for Terrorist Organizations to Exploit, Constantly
Reappearing Even After Removal.

Social media also attracts terrorist content due to the ease at
which those associated with the organizations can access the
platforms. To create a Twitter account, an individual only needs to
provide a name, phone number or e-mail, and create a password.42
Facebook requires the same information, in addition to a birth date.43
In turn, internet-based e-mail accounts, such as Gmail and Yahoo,
also require minimal information to set up, typically only a phone
number and birth date. 44 Such ease of access creates few, if any,
barriers to individuals creating multiple accounts, further
complicating the issue. 45 The ease of rejoining Twitter after an
account suspension or creating multiple Facebook accounts means
eliminating users is ultimately only a delay in—not a denial of—the
posting of terrorist content. 46 Because of this simplicity, the
environment generated by social media platforms welcomes those
41.

See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 37; see also O’Neill, supra note
34 (noting the use of social media to publish content recruiting for and
incitement to violence).

42.

TWITTER, https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup?lang=en (last visited Mar.
21, 2018).

43.

UNITE,
How
to
Join
Facebook,
DIGITAL
https://www.digitalunite.com/technology-guides/social-networkingblogs/facebook/how-join-facebook [https://perma.cc/6QR3-KU29 ] (last
visited Mar. 21, 2018).

44.

How to Create a New Yahoo Email Account, http://www.ptci.net/wpcontent/uploads/Yahoo-Email-Account.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PM3CQBXM] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also Setting Up a Gmail
GLOBAL,
Account,
GCF
https://www.gcflearnfree.org/print/gmail/setting-up-a-gmailaccount?playlist=Gmail (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).

45.

See Cellan-Jones, supra note 32 (discussing how a terrorist supporter
used multiple accounts, despite prohibitions against having multiple
accounts on social media networks).

46.

Laura Huey, This is Not Your Mother’s Terrorism: Social Media,
Online Radicalization and the Practice of Political Jamming, 6 J.
TERRORISM
RES.
1,
4
(2015),
available
at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication
/281275705_This_is_Not_Your_Mother’s_Terrorism_Social_Media_
Online_Radicalization_and_the_Practice_of_Political_Jamming.
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attempting to spread an unwelcome message. Hostile messages,
although perhaps in name disowned, in reality face few roadblocks to
reappearing on the platforms.
iii. Social Media’s Constant Evolution Makes an Environment Open to
Abuse by Terrorist Organizations as They Quickly Gain Access and
Recreate Their Perception for Each New Platform.

The internet’s evolving nature makes it an environment ripe for
abuse as ISIS seeks new, unregulated means of spreading its message.
Just over the past decade, the internet has changed dramatically. 47
From the launch of the iPhone in 2007, 48 to Facebook’s billionth user
in 2012, 49 and new interactive content, 50 the internet bears limited
resemblance to the worldwide web introduced in 1990. 51 Social media,
likewise, has undergone dramatic changes from the early time of
AOL 52 and Myspace. 53 Since that time, social media platforms such as
YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others, have allowed
users to take part in the ever-expanding worldwide web, generating
content and creating a new type of connectedness between people. 54
47.

Grace Reader, 11 Big Changes to the Internet from the Past Decade,
(July
28,
2016),
ENTREPRENEUR
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/279844 [perma.cc/C5UQ-UYD7].

48.

Rene Ritchie, 11 Years Ago Today, Steve Jobs Introduced the iPhone,
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.imore.com/history-iphone-original
[perma.cc/VNQ3-3TVB].

49.

Aaron Smith, Laurie Segall, & Stacy Cowley, Facebook Reaches One
(Oct.
4,
2012,
9:50
AM),
Billion
Users,
CNNTECH
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology/facebook-billionusers/index.html [perma.cc/56ZN-439Q].

50.

See Chirag Kulkarni, 11 Ways Social Media Will Evolve in the Future,
(Aug.
3,
2017),
ENTREPRENEUR
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/293454 [https://perma.cc/N8BGLBYL] (enumerating how social media has evolved to connect people
and offer new online mediums).

51.

Evan Andrews, Who Invented the Internet?, HISTORY (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/who-invented-the-internet
[https://perma.cc/2AQ6-ZC4S].

52.

Julia Sklar, AOL Instant Messenger Made Social Media What It Is
TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW
(Dec.
14,
2017),
Today,
MIT
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609769/aol-instant-messengermade-social-media-what-it-is-today/ [https://perma.cc/J547-UB9Y].

53.

Then and Now: A History of Social Networking Sites, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/then-and-now-a-history-of-socialnetworking-sites/7/ [https://perma.cc/R6GT-PE8W].

54.

Lees Rainie et al., The Strength of Internet Ties, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER
INTERNET
&
TECHNOLOGY
(Jan.
25,
2006),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2006/01/25/the-strength-of-internet-ties/
[https://perma.cc/H9DJ-EHEF].

IMORE
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Terrorist organizations take advantage of these evolving
networking opportunities, adapting their message to new cultural
trends. 55 Via social media, ISIS uses pop culture references to lure in
younger generations and change the way they view the organization
and its goals, a technique known as “jihadi cool.” 56 Described as a
“new hipster pop-jihadism,” jihadi cool accentuates the new “brand”
of jihad. 57 As EUROPOL notes:
The religious component in recruitment and radicalization is
being replaced by more social elements such as peer pressure
and role modelling. Additionally, the romantic prospects of
being part of an important and exciting development, apart
from more private considerations, may play a role. Suicide
bombers see themselves more as heroes than as religious
martyrs. 58

Terrorist organizations also manipulate media in an effort to draw
attention to themselves, such as using a picture of German Chancellor
Angela Merkel with a refugee and connecting the refugee to
terrorism. 59 A study by the Brookings Institute found that, in an
effort to increase viewership, 40 percent of ISIS’s videos included
“cultural images of modernity in order to promote a political project
based on anti-modern values.” 60 The constantly-evolving nature of
social media and pop culture creates an opportunity for ISIS to
infiltrate the platforms and use current trends to aid in the spread of
their content.

55.

Huey, supra note 46, at 1.

56.

Id.

57.

Kurt Eichenwald, Jihadi Cool: Belgium’s New Extremists are as Shallow
(Mar.
22,
2018),
as
They
are
Deadly,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/08/belgium-new-extremists-jihadicool-brussels-attacks-439640.html [https://perma.cc/9YCQ-S384].

58.

Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Terrorist Attacks,
3
(Jan.
18,
2016),
available
at
EUROPOL
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-inmodus-operandi-of-islamic-state-terrorists-attacks.

59.

Melissa Eddy, How a Refugee’s Selfie With Merkel Led to a Facebook
TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2017),
Lawsuit,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anasmodamani-germany-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/PZD3-7MLR].

60.

Javier Lesaca, On Social Media, ISIS Uses Modern Cultural Images to
Spread Anti-Modern Values, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: TECHTANK
(Sept.
24,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/09/24/on-social-mediaisis-uses-modern-cultural-images-to-spread-anti-modern-values/
[https://perma.cc/3GWS-RSZ3].
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2. Current Government Responses Fail to Effectively Address the
Appeal of Social Media for Terrorist Organizations and Their Presence on
Various Platforms.

Despite the numerous angles and tactics employed to combat
ISIS’s use of social media, social media companies and government
entities have failed to construct effective means of reducing its
presence online. 61 This failure stems from two underlying concerns
unaddressed by the entities’ efforts, namely the long-term threat
posed by ideologies like ISIS’s and jurisdictional gaps in coverage.
Current efforts support only short-term solutions to a long-term
problem thereby promoting inefficiency. Resource limitations further
exacerbate this problem. Similarly, jurisdiction-based responses fail to
appreciate the global nature of Islamic extremism. With these various
limitations, current solutions cannot achieve a meaningful barrier to
terrorist content.
i.
Short-term Solutions Typify Social Media Companies’ and
Government Entities’ Responses, Ignoring the Long-Term Ideological and
Methodological Threat Posed by ISIS’s Example.

Limited responses with a short-term perspective plague current
approaches to terrorists’ exploitation of social media. Without fully
appreciating the expansive threat posed by radical Islamic ideologies
and the powerful tool social media companies have placed in the
hands of the ordinary people, those responding to the threat present
flawed solutions. 62 The possibility for future terrorist organizations to
develop from ISIS, when considered in light of the limitations faced by
current responses both in terms of software and resources, highlights
the challenge faced by those tasked with reducing the threat posed by
terrorist content on social media. 63
National governments focus their solutions on addressing the
threats here-and-now, overlooking the long-term ideological and
methodological threats posed by the current use of social media by
ISIS. Just as ISIS developed from the foundation laid by al-Qaeda, so
too could the next major terrorist threat to global safety and

61.

Patrikarakos, supra note 9.

62.

See Bruce Hoffman, INSIDE TERRORISM 214-220 (2006) (noting the
difficulty those combating terrorism may have in identifying the
religious motivations of terrorist groups).

63.

See Assaf Baciu, Artificial Intelligence is More Artificial Than
(Dec.
7,
2016,
11:00
AM),
Intelligent,
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/2016/12/artificial-intelligence-artificialintelligent/ [https://perma.cc/9Z29-PCWM] (noting the challenges
facing the development of truly effective artificial intelligence programs).
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security. 64 In his cultural history of terrorism, Michael Burleigh
follows the trends of Islamic terrorism starting in the late 1970s,
noting the combination of religious enthusiasm and secondary events
which spurred increased terrorist activity. 65 Such trends can easily
continue into the future. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria and AlShabaab in Somalia, both originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, have
pledged allegiance to ISIS. 66 Each holds the same ideological goals of
establishing a caliphate and, based on the attacks each has committed
on the citizens of their “home” countries, appears to accept ISIS’s
perspective on violence as well. 67 Should these two organizations seek
to develop a larger international presence, they would likely look to
ISIS’s use of social media as an example.
Similarly, terrorist organizations do not copyright or trademark
their tactics—they may freely develop off the “successes” of others.
Terrorist organizations can take, develop, and manipulate the
methods of violence previously used by others to fit their needs. 68 As
such, the use of one tactic by an organization can quickly spread to
others, even if they do not share ideological similarities. 69
The development of suicide bombings as a means of terrorist
attack demonstrates the auxiliary nature of shared ideological fervor.70
Suicide bombing, according to historian Jeffrey Lewis, developed
along-side the creation of dynamite. 71 Prior to the Russian Revolution,
one radical held the dynamite while approaching the czar, not
detonating until close enough to kill them both. 72 The Japanese
64.

See Michael Burleigh, BLOOD AND RAGE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
TERRORISM 346 (2009) (noting the pattern of Islamic terrorism and its
development off of trends formed in the Middle Ages).

65.

Id.

66.

Holly Yan, Not Just ISIS: Terror Groups Worldwide Jockey for Power,
CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/04/world/non-isisterror-groups-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/5WMH-2KCT]; see
also Robyn Kriel & Briana Duggan, Al-Shabaab Faction Pledges
Allegiance
to
ISIS,
CNN
(Oct.
23,
2015,
3:37
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/22/africa/al-shabaab-factionisis/index.html [https://perma.cc/UE4H-VA5V].

67.

Yan, supra note 66.

68.

See Jeffrey William Lewis, The Human Use of Human Beings: A Brief
History of Suicide Bombing, 6 ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS HIST. PERS.
(2013),
http://origins.osu.edu/article/human-use-human-beings-briefhistory-suicide-bombing [https://perma.cc/L497-TTAX] (noting the
spread of the concept of suicide bombing from imperial Russia, to
kamikazes in Japan, to Islamic terrorism).

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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adopted this approach for the Kamikazes in World War II.73
Hezbollah in the 1980s generated the type of suicide bombing typical
of today, using the tactic against U.S. military installations. 74 This
form of development presents a problem for national governments’
current responses. No international database of terrorist methods
exists. 75 National governments tend to focus on those threats most
concerning to them in the present or near future, as evidenced by
their special designations of “terrorist organizations.” 76 Relying on
restricted perspectives and lack of appreciation for the long-term
ideological and methodological threat stemming from ISIS’s example,
counterterrorism efforts will necessarily have limited prospective
impact.
Limitations in technology used to identify and eliminate terrorist
content further compounds the failings created by a short-term
perspective. Social media companies, especially Facebook, rely on
artificial intelligence software to identify content that infringes on
copyrights or contains child pornography. 77 More recently, companies
have tried to alter the algorithms to identify extremist images or
language and delete the accounts created by banned users. 78 Through
such tools, Twitter removed nearly 300,000 accounts linked to
terrorism. 79 Terrorist content, however, is far more likely to be used in
news articles or non-propaganda settings than restricted content –a
73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

See Stefan Stieglitz et al., Social Media Analytics – Challenges in Topic
Discovery, Data Collection, and Data Preparation, 39 INT’L J. INFO.
MGMT. 156, 161-65 (2018) (noting the “newness” of social media
analytics and the challenges in synthesizing “big data,” namely volume,
relevancy, storage requirements, formatting, and the structuring the
information).

76.

Statewatch Comparative Analysis of the US, UK, UN and EU “Terrorist
Lists,”
STATEWATCH.ORG,
http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/listsbground.html
[https://perma.cc/C4NC-PD9T] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also
List of Groups Designated Terrorist Organisations by the UAE, THE
NATIONAL
(Nov.
16,
2014,
4:00
AM),
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designatedterrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037
[https://perma.cc/U4TCPKPF].

77.

Emily Dreyfuss, Facebook’s Counterterrorism Playbook Comes Into
Focus, WIRED (June 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/facebookcounterterrorism/ [https://perma.cc/QTB2-TFSA].

78.

Id.

79.

Adam Satariano, Twitter Suspends 300,000 Accounts Tied to Terrorism
in 2017, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 19, 2017, 10:33 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-19/twittersuspends-300-000-accounts-in-2017-for-terrorism-content.
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contextual distinction difficult for computer programs to accurately
determine. 80 For example, in 2011, a French teacher sued Facebook
for removing a picture he posted of a piece of artwork by Gustave
Courbet, on the grounds that the work depicting a naked woman was
art, not explicit material. 81
Relying on artificial intelligence to make such contextual
distinctions undermines the full effectiveness of the algorithms as
mathematical calculations struggle to make the determination. 82 As
one author notes, only through “human hand-holding” and years of
training do machines like IBM’s Watson win against Jeopardy
greats. 83 The years necessary to hone the technology to address
specific content fails to effectively counter the evolving nature of
terrorist organizations. Altering programs to perform at the level
necessary takes time—time which works in terrorist’s favor.
National governments’ offensive efforts likewise demonstrate their
short-sighted perspective on the distribution and use of limited
resources. The U.S., for example, produces counter-propaganda to
dilute the influence of ISIS publications. 84 During 2013-2014, the State
Department published over 300 videos on YouTube to specifically
counter ISIS, the most popular video having 120,000 views.85 On
Twitter, the U.S. operates six different accounts for this purpose.86
These posts, however, face an uphill battle. Not only do they miss the
long-term threat from future terrorist organizations who may adopt
ISIS’s example, 87 they must also gain attention in the overwhelming
80.

See Heidi Glenn, How Facebook Uses Technology To Block TerroristRelated
Content,
NPR
(June
22,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/06/22/533855547
/how-facebook-uses-technology-to-block-terrorist-related-content
[https://perma.cc/FJ76-B37C] (discussing anecdotes where Facebook’s
algorithms have flagged news content and employees restored the
content after reviewing it themselves).

81.

Vivienne Walt, Why a French Court Could Disrupt Facebook’s Global
Ambitions, TIME (May 21, 2015), http://time.com/3892097/facebookjurisdiction-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/4M7K-QRFB].

82.

See Baciu, supra note 63 (describing A.I.’s continued reliance on
humans for context-based determinations).

83.

Id.

84.

Javier Lesaca, Fight Against ISIS Reveals Power of Social Media, THE
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE:
TECHTANK
(Nov.
19,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/11/19/fight-againstisis-reveals-power-of-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/AAT2-6KY2].

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

See Kriel & Duggan, supra note 66 (reporting an Al Shabaab faction’s
declaration of allegiance to ISIS).
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sea of social media content. Such counter-narratives must fight for
influence amongst the 6,000 tweets made per second. 88 Not only must
the counter-propaganda reach those same individuals targeted by ISIS
to be truly effective, but they must attempt to do so amidst a
staggering amount of other material. Even videos face a battle as
YouTube estimates that users upload 48 hours of content every
minute, accumulating to eight years of content a day. 89
Additionally, these efforts do little to groups like ISIS who do not
care about local, popular support and have the sheer quantity of usergenerated content on their side. 90 Providing a counter-narrative
undoubtedly contributes to the disruption of ISIS’s presence on
platforms. Such counter-propaganda, however, challenges a narrative
ISIS cares little about as evidenced by the treatment of those in
Raqqa. 91 Instead of using these social media resources to generate
fewer but more impactful posts or to head-off developing terrorist
organizations, the best counter-propaganda comes from those with
likely even fewer resources. Footage leaked by a Kurdish media
network showed the rescue of ISIS-held, Kurdish prisoners. 92 That
video received 1.2 million views in five days. 93 Lacking analytics to see
the trends in terrorist organizations and their tactics across platforms
and nations, 94 social media companies’ and national governments’
work gets only a portion of the overall picture, or ends up drowning
in an crushing amount of user content unable to have a truly effective
response.
ii. Reliance on National Regulations to Combat Terrorist Content on
Social Media Creates Gaps in Coverage Exploitable by Terrorist
Organizations.

Jurisdictional and treaty gaps additionally plague the ability of
those combatting terrorism to do so effectively. Conflicts of
jurisdiction arise as each nation attempts to address the threat in its
own way. These conflicts stem from a variety of factors, including
88.

INTERNET LIVE STATS,
http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitterstatistics/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/26J5-PTV7].

89.

U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR
TERRORIST
PURPOSES
126
(2012),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Te
rrorist_Purposes.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLL3-XSQB].

90.

World Affairs, William McCants: The ISIS Apocalypse, YOUTUBE (Dec.
21,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kur-qWNkzng
[https://perma.cc/52YP-8JFT].

91.

Lesaca, supra note 84; see also The Raqqa Diaries, supra note 20.

92.

Lesaca, supra note 85.

93.

Id.

94.

See Stieglitz et al., supra note 75.
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each nation’s different regulatory schemes and the international
community’s lack of a comprehensive response, resulting in the
absence of a universal standard underlying jurisdictional differences.
Without uniformity at either the national or international level,
terrorist organizations will be quick to exploit any gaps in coverage
they discover.
At its core, the nature of terrorism alters the stakes at issue when
discussing terrorist content on social media, limiting the effectiveness
of purely national responses. Unlike crimes which occur wholly within
one jurisdiction, the spread of terrorist content across social media
absorbs the characteristics of terrorism and cybercrimes, generating a
transnational conflict. 95 According to the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence, cyber instability poses a growing threat to international
security, rivaling terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass
destruction. 96 Given this threat, national governments seek better
responses to terrorist organizations’ use of social media, but
conflicting regulatory measures fail to create an effective obstacle to
the influence wielded online. For example, both France and Germany
have proposed regulations for social media companies for the content
posted on their platforms. 97 Germany proposed to fine the companies
for any hate speech not removed within 24 hours. 98 France, in
comparison, proposed a regulation requiring platforms to reveal
sponsored content or the government would block internet access to
their platform. 99 Such differences in regulations create hurdles for the
companies to comply with and potentially cause jurisdictions to
become safe harbors for terrorist content because of lax or non95.

Catherine Lotrionte, Symposium: International Law and the Internet:
Adapting Legal Frameworks in Response to Online Warfare and
Revolutions Fueled by Social Media: State Sovereignty and Self-Defense
in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 25
EMORY INT’L. REV. 825, 828 (2012).

96.

See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L SEC., WORLDWIDE THREAT
ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2018) (addressing
the threats of cybercrime, weapons of mass destruction, and organized
crime).

97.

Janet Burns, Germany To Social Media Sites: Remove Hate Speech in
24 Hours or Face $57 Million Fines, FORBES (Jun. 30, 2017, 7:36 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/06/30/germany-nowallows-up-to-57m-in-fines-if-facebook-doesnt-remove-hate-speechfast/#1f56b45d761d [https://perma.cc/FB9M-PPLE]; see also Jean
Baptiste Su, France To Impose Restrictions on Facebook, Twitter In
Fight Against Fake News During Elections, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2018, 1:20
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/01/09/francecould-ban-facebook-twitter-in-fight-against-fake-news-duringelections/#3445b96d49da [https://perma.cc/GYS2-9DXQ].

98.

Burns, supra note 97.

99.

Su, supra note 97.
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existent regulations on an issue. 100 Because regulation through
national jurisdictions promotes gaps and variances in coverage,
international law offers a comprehensive alternative.
Current international law, however, fails to take more than a
patchwork approach to addressing the impact of terrorist content.101
International treaties and agreements make few, if any, references to
cyberattacks or terrorist publications. 102 Rather than comprehensive
coverage, the treaties approach terrorism in a piecemeal fashion, each
addressing a specific type of terrorism or aspect of its spread.103
Further, the lack of a universal definition of “terrorism” inhibits the
international community’s ability to create a more comprehensive
agreement. 104 The U.N. Security Council’s resolutions cover more of
the threats, including cyberattacks, but maintain the patchwork
limitations. 105 Resolutions and reports, however, pose no binding
authority on state action. 106 Without a means of enforcement against
states, many international law resolutions or agreements remain
recommendations for state behavior rather than impactful laws
addressing a global security issue. 107 This lack of consensus results in
100. See U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 86, at ¶ 91
(discussing the lack of a universal instrument addressing terrorist
activity online and providing guidance on the criminalization,
investigation, and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the internet).
101. See U.N. OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM, International Legal
Instruments, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legalinstruments.shtml [https://perma.cc/9LJ8-LQF4] (last visited Mar. 21,
2018) (recognizing the 19 international counter-terrorism instruments
and each document’s individual focus).
102. Lotrionte, supra note 95, at 905-06.
103. See U.N. OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 94 (reciting the
key General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and their
targeted application).
104. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 4 (2002).
105. David P. Fidler, Cyberspace, Terrorism and International Law, 21 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 475, 478-79 (2016).
106. See U.N. Security Council, Functions and Powers, UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml (lists functions as
suggestions and recommendations but does not include methods of
enforcement upon individual state action); see also Marko Divac Oberg,
The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
879, 883 (2006) (discussing binding effects of General Assembly actions).
107. See Are UN Resolutions Binding?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY,
http://ask.un.org/faq/15010 (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) (lists examples
of resolutions and discusses how the nature of resolutions determines the
extent to which they are binding on States); see also Oberg, supra note
103.
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nothing more than suggestions for states to follow, with no impact on
states’ actions and maintaining the regulatory gaps.
Social media’s role in facilitating terrorist content raises the
question of social media companies’ responsibilities for self-censoring
posts that recruit for or incite violence. Throughout the U.S. and
Europe, individuals have filed civil legal claims against social media
companies for their role in facilitating and/or radicalizing terrorists.108
Twitter, specifically, faces legal claims from families of the victims of
the ISIS terror attacks in Paris and Brussels. 109 The families argue
that Twitter aided and abetted ISIS before, during, and after the
attacks; they allege that “among social media platforms, Twitter has
been the most stubborn one to refuse to cut off its service to
terrorists, taking the position that ‘the tweets must flow,’ even if it
means assisting in mass murder.” 110 A Dallas police officer injured in
the 2016 shooting filed a claim against Facebook, Google, and Twitter
alleging the same concerns. 111 But for the use of these platforms,
according to the officer, the attacker would not have shot at the
police. 112 German courts heard a similar case against Facebook
brought by the refugee whose picture with Chancellor Merkel was
manipulated by terrorist organizations. 113 Though these cases have yet
to hold social media companies liable, they demonstrate the judicial
system’s openness to holding social media companies responsible for
their role in facilitating terrorist violence.

108. Nina Iacono Brown, Should Social Media Networks Be Held Liable for
(June
16,
2017,
7:14
AM),
Terrorism?,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/06/a_ne
w_legal_theory_for_holding_social_networks_liable_for_terrorism.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/8UYG-W7GK]; see also Eddy, supra note 59.
109. Ilana Messika, Israeli NGO Sues Twitter for Aiding and Abetting
Terrorism,
THE
JEWISH
VOICE
(Jan.
11,
2017),
http://thejewishvoice.com/2017/01/11/israeli-ngo-sues-twitter-foraiding-and-abetting-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/LJ2D-H9UG].
110. Id.
111. Mario Machado, Social Media Giants Sued for Aiding and Abetting
Attack on Dallas Cops, MIMESIS LAW (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/social-media-giants-sued-for-aidingand-abetting-attack-on-dallas-cops/15580
[https://perma.cc/3L6P3Y6L].
112. Id.
113. Eddy, supra note 59.
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III. Social Media Companies Should Be Held Liable for
Aiding and Abetting Terrorist Organizations When
They Knowingly Permit Terrorist Speech to Remain
on Their Platforms.
Without a redirection of incentives, few long-term barriers to
terrorist content on social media platforms will develop. Utilizing a
narrow definition of prohibited “terrorist speech,” enforced through
national criminal justice systems, social media companies should now
be held liable for aiding and abetting terrorism. The combination of
an international aiding and abetting standard and a universal
definition of “terrorist speech” counters the commercial incentives,
enabling companies to self-regulate and avoid liability. Having social
media companies take responsibility for knowingly permitting the
most dangerous forms of “terrorist speech” to remain on their
platforms after notification refutes social media companies’ incentives.
If the companies fail to respond, however, a means of imposing
punishment is available. Joint implementation through both
international monitoring and national enforcement provides a means
of holding companies responsible and further counters the incentives
towards short-term, ineffective solutions.
A. A Limited Definition of “Terrorist Speech” In Conjunction with the
Use of An International Aiding and Abetting Standard Best Facilitates
Holding Social Media Companies Responsible for Terrorist Content.
1.

Limiting the Scope of Liability by Narrowly Defining What Type of
Speech and Whose Speech Can Create Liability for Social Media
Companies Protects Free Expression While Providing a Means of SelfCensorship to Companies.

Prior to any discussion of liability, a clear articulation of what
content creates liability is necessary. To formulate a definition of
what type of speech should justify liability, a careful balance must be
struck between national security concerns and free expression. 114 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codified the
principles of freedom of expression in Article 19, stating that,

114. See Marne Levine, Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on
(May
28,
2013,
4:51
PM),
Facebook,
FACEBOOK
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmfuland-hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054/
[https://perma.cc/P3WS-WQ6B] (commenting on the balance Facebook
has sought to strike between identifying harmful content and freedom of
expression).
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“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.” 115

It recognizes, however, that such freedom is subject to restriction
when necessary to protect the rights of others or for the protection of
national security or public order. 116 U.S. law also recognizes this
principle in the Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, which
prohibits speech that “is directed to inciting or producing such
imminent lawless [i.e., violent] action that is likely to incite or
produce such action.” 117 Similarly, international treaties have not
protected “speech likely to incite violence or recruit[e] others for the
incitement of violence.” 118 Defining “terrorist speech” within the
confines of the Brandenburg test would severely limit the speech in
question and subject to prosecution. Terrorist organizations, despite
their flaws, could still peacefully advocate for their views and would
only have a restriction placed on their speech when used in a manner
to threaten national security and public safety through their advocacy
of violent action. Through this limited restriction, disagreement and
dissent can flourish while violence and participation in terrorism faces
a barrier.
In addition to restricting what form of speech would trigger
liability, whose speech creates liability should also be determined.
National and international bodies already provide a means of
determining what “terrorist” expressions should be targeted. The
United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, European
Union, and the United Nations all have “terrorist lists” which identify
the scope and legal effect of being designated as a “terrorist
organization.” 119 Though these designations vary in whether they
identify only groups or groups and individuals, each symbolizes the
nations’ concerns—concerns which flow into the online environment
with every post containing terrorist speech. Using these lists in each
respective country for the identification of “terrorist speech”
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, ¶ 2,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
116. Id.
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
118. See International Covenant, supra note 112 (regarding the art. 19
language on restrictions to the right to expression to protect national
security or public order).
119. Statewatch Comparative Analysis of the US, UK, UN and EU “Terrorist
Lists,” supra note 76; see also List of Groups Designated Terrorist
Organizations by the UAE, supra note 76.
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eliminates the struggles witnessed in international law for
implementing a universal “terrorism” definition. 120 Government
entities and social media companies’ failure to create effective
restrictions on their own necessitates alternatives—alternatives which
change the incentives at play between terrorist organizations, social
media companies, and government entities. Respecting the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, a limited understanding of both
“terrorist” and “speech” provides a clear distinction of whose and
what speech social media companies should be held responsible for,
striking an importance balance between national security and free
expression.
2. Social Media Companies’ Failure to Act is Most Analogous to
Aiding and Abetting, Making it the Best Means of Imposing Liability in
Domestic Courts.

Imposing responsibility on social media companies punishes their
hesitation to self-censor and the facilitation of terrorist activity which
follows. Aiding and abetting provides the best conduit for
implementing liability against social media companies because it
focuses on the “facilitation” role their lack of self-censorship plays in
the promotion of ISIS’s content. In the United States, the aiding and
abetting statute reads as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal. 121

Under this code section, aiding and abetting has constituted
participating in an armed drug deal, 122 assisting an officer of the
Internal Revenue Service receive more compensation than authorized
by law, 123 and possessing heroin with the intent to distribute.124
Statutes such as this provide the best path for imposing liability
because they recognize that, though the companies have not posted
the content themselves, they bear a responsibility for their role in
facilitating the recruitment for or incitement to violence called for in
terrorist speech.
120. See Dershowitz, supra note 104 (discussing the struggle to create a
universal definition of terrorism).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
122. Rosemond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2013).
123. Standefer v. U.S., 477 U.S. 10 (1980).
124. U.S. v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382 (2014).
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In essence, holding social media companies responsible through
aiding and abetting would copy the changes made in the U.S. for the
Communications Decency Act. 125 Introduced in 2017 and signed into
law in April 2018, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sext
Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA) reduces the protections in Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act. 126 Previously, Section 230
does not impose liability on intermediary websites for sex traffickingrelated content posted by others; FOSTA withdraws this immunity
for internet companies which permit content that facilitates sex
trafficking. 127 The Senate Commerce Committee’s report on SESTA128
cited a lawsuit alleging that the website Backpage.com facilitated sex
trafficking through its online classified advertising in the “Adult
Entertainment” category. 129 Plaintiffs alleged that because the website
had few verification procedures and allowed workarounds, such as
restricting posts containing the words “barely legal” but not “brly
legal,” the website’s “rules and processes governing the content of
advertisements are designed to encourage sex trafficking.” 130 The same
workarounds are available through social media companies’
procedures. As mentioned previously, platforms have few, if any, real
restrictions on the replication of previously-banned accounts, and
artificial intelligence struggles to identify terrorist speech. 131 Because
of these similarities, liability should also be imposed on social media
125. See Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong.
(2018) (imposing liability on third parties by altering the
Communications
Decency
Act),
available
at
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/sex-trafficking-bill-becomescenter-debate-about-tech-responsibility-n892876
126. Id.; see also Andrew Liptak, Wikipedia Warns that SESTA Will Strip
Away Protections Vital to its Existence, THE VERGE (Nov. 11, 2017 3:07
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/11/16637774/wikipedia-sestaserious-concerns-section-230-internet [https://perma.cc/399L-EVY5]; see
also Tom Jackman, House Passes Anti-Online Sex Trafficking Bill,
Allows Targeting of Websites Like Backpage.com, WASHINGTON POST,
Feb.
27,
2018,
https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/truecrime/wp/2018/02/27/house-passes-anti-online-sex-trafficking-billallows-targeting-of-websites-like-backpagecom/?utm_term=.db4d30d99575 [https://perma.cc/6GRE-76R5].
127. Elliot Harmon, SESTA Approved by Senate Commerce Committee—Still
an Awful Bill, EEF: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/11/sesta-approved-senatecommerce-committee-still-awful-bill [https://perma.cc/9LPV-B9K3].
128. S. REP. NO. 115-199 (2018).
129. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (2016).
130. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 16-17.
131. See Baciu, supra note 63 (describing the limitations and potential of
AI).
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companies who fail to take down content after becoming aware of its
existence. Connecting the idea of third-party liability provided by
SESTA with the responsibility for “facilitation” imposed through
aiding and abetting constructs a means of holding social media
companies responsible for the terrorist speech spread through the
platforms they control.
3.

Using an Aiding and Abetting Standard Based in Customary
International Law Creates the Strongest, Most Comprehensive
Foundation for Liability.

Relying on customary international law as the basis for the aiding
and abetting standard provides the easiest foundation for universal
acceptance and application in national jurisdictions. Customary
international law reflects those routine state practices that have
become so prominent and accepted within the international
community as to constitute a legal obligation, such as the immunity
granted ambassadors of foreign countries. 132 The concept of aiding and
abetting already holds a place in customary international law. 133
Countries from a wide variety of legal and cultural backgrounds
already accept the premise of aiding and abetting liability.134 In its
extensive study on the principles of international customary
humanitarian law, the International Committee for the Red Cross
found the law included that “[n]o one may be convicted of an offence
except on the basis of individual criminal responsibility,” with
“individual criminal responsibility” including facilitating, aiding, or
abetting the commission of a crime. 135 A subsequent rule of customary
international law finds that all parties to a conflict, whether
international or domestic armed conflicts, have an obligation to
respect customary international law. 136 This legal obligation and
widespread use already by many national governments provides a
simply means of integrating liability into established legal systems

132. See Customary International Law, Legal Information Institute, CORNELL
LAW
SCHOOL,
available
at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law;
see
also Roozbeh B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st
Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173, 204
(2010).
133. JEAN-MARIA HENKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES 372-73 (2009).
134. See ANIA RAMSASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND
CONFLICT 13 (FAFO 2006) (surveying countries from every hemisphere
and from both civil and common law legal systems).
135. HENKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 133, at 372-73.
136. Id. at 495
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and encouraging adoption across the global—simultaneously creating
a more comprehensive barrier to terrorist speech on social media. 137
Using customary international law entails the expansion of
existing state practice to impose liability and incentivize the
elimination of terrorist speech—it requires no new law or concept of
responsibility. In her article, Catherine Lotrionte, former Assistant
General Counsel at the CIA, calls for the international community to
apply preexisting customary international law rules for war to cyberattacks. 138 This would not require a “reinvention” of current law, but
rather would address how current international norms about state
behavior apply to cyberspace. 139 The Fafo Institute in the Netherlands
conducted a survey of sixteen countries from around the globe asking
whether the countries had statutes imposing liability on corporations
for being complicit in a crime. 140 Though not every country applied
the laws to corporations, every country had some form of liability
based on knowingly helping the commission of a crime. 141 Founded on
state practice, the international community can generate a sufficiently
concrete definition of aiding and abetting mimicking Lotrionte’s
suggestion for cyberspace but applying to terrorist speech. 142 Applying
this logic forces the international community to generate a long-term
solution for the problem they have thus far only approached in a
patchwork fashion.
B. Joint Implementation Through INTERPOL’s Existing Resources
and National Judicial Systems Provides the Best of International and
National Systems for Combatting Terrorist Speech.

Nations can impose liability through the international standard
on social media platforms should they fail to remove terrorist speech.
In a joint effort by nations and INTERPOL, platforms receive more
monitoring and better enforcement for the removal of content.
Working with each nations’ existing designations of terrorist
organizations, INTERPOL’s intelligence and information sharing
systems can implement monitoring specific to each jurisdiction’s
designations, while maintaining a “bird’s eye view” for the
development of international trends. 143 After the identification of
137. Id.
138. Lotrionte, supra note 95, at 838.
139. Id.
140. RAMSASTRY & THOMPSON, supra note 134, at 13.
141. Id.
142. Lotrionte, supra note 95, at 838.
143. See Data Exchange, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOLexpertise/Data-exchange [https://perma.cc/2SLN-8EDV] (last visited
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terrorist speech, INTERPOL will notify the social media companies of
the content, making them aware of its presence and need for removal.
Should social media companies remove the content, the system
continues, and the threat posed by such speech is reduced. If they do
not remove it, however, national judicial systems may step in and
impose liability through the judicial systems, simultaneously
providing an appeals process for any misidentification or contextual
ambiguity. Dividing enforcement between national jurisdictions and
INTERPOL provides for the strongest comprehensive solution to
terrorist speech, while recognizing and working within jurisdictional
and cultural differences.
The limited definition of “terrorist speech” in turn restricts the
scope of INTERPOL’s notifications and monitoring, focusing it on the
content produced by terrorist organizations of specific concern to each
nation. Created in 1923, the International Criminal Police
Commission, changing its name to INTERPOL in 1956, aims to
support the policemen and women of its 192 member states in both
domestic and international cooperative efforts. 144 Every INTERPOL
member country has a National Central Bureau linking national
police forces with international efforts. 145 As part of its work regarding
terrorism, INTERPOL created two databases, MIND and FIND, to
facilitate information-sharing between countries, specifically aiding
states in screening people and travel documents at border crossings in
order to help identify terrorists, fugitives, and lost or stolen travel
documents. 146 A similar database could facilitate the efforts to combat
terrorist speech.
Providing consistent monitoring through INTERPOL increases
the likelihood of terrorist speech and trends in such speech being
found and removed quickly before they can take root on platforms.147
Utilizing INTERPOL’s existing information-sharing systems while
having National Central Bureau’s focus on the specific terrorist
organizations of concern to the nation allows the system to function
Oct. 27, 2018) (demonstrating Interpol’s capabilities and connection
with other countries).
https://www.interpol.int/About144. History,
INTERPOL,
INTERPOL/History [https://perma.cc/NFU7-B4UB] (last visited Mar.
21, 2018).
145. Structure and Governance, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/AboutINTERPOL/Structure-and-governance/National-Central-Bureaus
[https://perma.cc/UWS5-ZNGT ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
146. Javier Gardeazabal & Todd Sandler, INTERPOL’s Surveillance
Networking in Curbing Transnational Terrorism, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 761, 762-3 (2015).
147. See Satariano, supra note 79 (noting the increased monitoring efforts by
Twitter resulted in a reduction in ISIS-related accounts).
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with the best of both international and national resources. 148 Through
the National Central Bureau’s connection to INTERPOL, monitoring
is no longer an isolated activity of each state. Rather, monitoring
takes place as part of a global effort to identify new terrorist trends,
while each bureau’s monitoring and notification respects national
sovereignty through its use of national terrorist designations.
Once the monitoring identifies terrorist speech, INTERPOL may
notify social media companies or national law enforcement about its
existence. INTERPOL’s system of notices provides an example of how
such communication may occur. 149 “Notices” constitute one of the
main methods of international information-sharing facilitated by
INTERPOL; through them, the international community may assist
or is made aware of important crime-related information. 150 These
notices undergo a rigorous screening process prior to issuing, including
limitations on the nature of the activities which can receive notices
and screening of information through INTERPOL’s Rules on the
Processing of Data which ensures sufficient substantiation of
notices. 151 Many of the hurdles this process creates for the issuance of
a notice for criminals, missing persons, or similarly serious crimes, do
not pose barriers for the identification of terrorist speech because of
the nation’s role in designating the terrorist organizations. Should
nations wish a more stringent screening of the notices sent by
INTEPROL to social media companies, however, each National
Central Bureau could include those procedures or national law
enforcement could personally review the would-be notices prior to
issuing them to companies. On the whole, such notifications would
include information relevant to the social media company for
identifying the problematic content and the jurisdictional
requirements for removing it. Without the logistical and political
barriers weighing down international law and national enforcement,
INTERPOL can act faster to identify terrorist speech and sources of
new threats.
Should a social media company disagree with or ignore the
notification resulting from INTERPOL’s monitoring, national judicial
systems may step in and prosecute. By freeing national governments
from monitoring, INTERPOL allows the governments to focus more
on imposing liability against social media companies should they fail
148. Databases,
INTERPOL,
https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOLexpertise/Databases [https://perma.cc /H4MN-JN2B ] (last visited Mar.
21, 2018).
https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL149. See
Notices,
INTERPOL,
expertise/Notices [https://perma.cc /3EUX-RHCB] (last visited Mar.
21, 2018) (outing the INTERPOL notice system).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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to remove content. This adds greater weight to the restrictions on
content posted and allowed to remain on social media platforms.152
National jurisdictions may now redirect efforts toward prosecutions
and the enforcement of criminal punishments against social media
companies, directly countering their commercial incentives.
Liability for aiding and abetting supplies the impetus to influence
social media companies towards more self-censorship should the social
media companies ignore INTERPOL notices. Once national
jurisdictions determine that the social media companies have aided
and abetted terrorist activity by knowingly permitting terrorist
speech to remain on the platform, criminal or civil penalties can be
sought against the company. In the United States, violations for
aiding and abetting receive the same punishment as if the actor had
committed the crime themselves. 153 Given the nature of the
violation—being speech inciting violence and not violence itself—there
is room for courts to impose monetary fines or alternative sanctions
against the companies. Regardless of the exact punishment sought,
however, criminal liability prevents physical harm sooner than civil
liability alone, as cases do not require the manifestation of physical
harm prior to liability. 154 The civil lawsuits filed against social media
companies by terror victims’ families all came after people died due to
terrorist attacks. 155 Pursing criminal liability for terrorist speech
allows the government to identify the harm not as a completed
terrorist act, but as the recruitment for or the potential for inciting
one—thus taking action aimed at stopping the violence before it
begins.
Additionally, social media companies should not be threatened by
the use of government enforcement. Citizens have regularly turned to
their governments to address national security concerns. And in an
effort to promote the safety and security of the nation, governments
have found some rights are not unlimited. For example, U.S.
corporations do not have an unrestricted right to be bought. Rather,
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. reviews mergers,
acquisitions, and other corporate transactions to ensure that they do
not threaten national security. 156 This proposal simply reflects the
152. See Patrikarakos, supra note 9 (citing tech companies’ reluctance to
remove certain content unless there is a business incentive).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Messika, supra note 109 (noting the filing of civil claims
against social media companies for the companies’ involvement in
terrorist attacks after the attacks had been carried out); see also
Machado, supra note 103 (same).
156. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS), (2019), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
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national security concerns arising from the narrowly-defined speech at
issue. Likewise, this limited definition fits better within the accepted
understanding, at least in the U.S. of protected First Amendment
rights. Critics of FOSTA suggest that the elimination of the safe
harbor in reality makes the world more dangerous, driving sex
workers underground and inadvertently supporting only those large
companies which can afford the staff necessary to monitor the
website. 157 In comparison, this proposal rests on an established
understanding of prohibited speech and actions, and does not require
any additional monitoring by social media companies due to the
notice they would receive. Only those companies which choose to fight
the notification would have to. At the same time however, those
concerned with abuse by government officials could take comfort in
the procedural safeguards both in the required notice and the judicial
system. The unclassified nature of the notices, while this is not a
guarantee against abuse, does provide a public record should the
government overstep.
The outlined approach would simultaneously reinforce a
preventative focus, while incentivizing social media companies to selfregulate and monitor for terrorist activity. Holding social media
companies liable for aiding and abetting introduces the incentives
necessary for the companies to embrace more self-censorship.
Responsibility reduces the commercial incentives that undermine the
creation and enforcement of the content restrictions necessary to
effectively prevent the spread of terrorist speech. 158 Inherently, social
media companies are profit-making endeavors. 159 Facebook alone made
$8.03 billion from sales in the first quarter of 2017, averaging about
$4.23 in sales from each user. 160 Part of the appeal of these platforms,
and in turn what makes them popular enough to make such profits, is
issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-unitedstates-cfius [https://perma.cc/G37B-D2NJ].
157. Amanda Arnold, Here’s What’s Wrong With the So-Called Anti-Sex
YORK
(Mar.
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2018),
Trafficking
Bill,
NEW
https://www.thecut.com/2018/03/sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-billfosta.html [https://perma.cc/6JDL-AMLW]; Anna Schecter and Dennis
Romero, FOSTA Sex Trafficking Law Becomes Center of Debate About
NEWS
(July
19,
2018),
Tech
Responsibility,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/sex-trafficking-bill-becomescenter-debate-about-tech-responsibility-n892876
[ https://perma.cc/268S-LTQW].
158. Patrikarakos, supra note 9.
159. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Made About $4.23 Off Your Profile in the
First Three Months of the Year, CNBC (May 3, 2017 6:03 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/03/facebook-average-revenue-per-userarpu-q1-2017.html [https://perma.cc/3VCV-T4HE].
160. Id.
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their perceived role as an open forum for society. 161 Imposing criminal
liability through monetary fines, for example, counters the financial
benefits causing social media companies’ hesitancy to self-censor.
Now, rather than viewing each new user just as an additional $4.23 of
revenue, each user also poses a risk and liability that the company
must be willing to take on. Free speech can remain a corporate
principle for the companies because the limited definition of “terrorist
speech” requires only the restriction of speech likely to incite violence
or recruit for violent activities. 162 Criminal liability permits social
media companies to continue to pursue profits but imposes a sanction
should they fail to comply and ignore terrorist speech.

IV. Holding Social Media Companies Responsible
Addresses the Residual Concerns Related to Free
Expression and National Sovereignty.
This proposal resolves the ideological and logistical
implementation problems facing current responses to ISIS’s terrorist
speech, but also the more fundamental considerations made when
determining how to respond in the first place. Each response chosen
by a company or government reflects a decision about what values—
whether freedom of expression or national security—the decision
maker prioritizes. Similarly, when looking at the implementation of
any new program, particularly one influenced by international law,
nations will likely hesitate to give up sovereignty on such an
important issue. The implementation of an aiding and abetting
standard through a mixture of international and national systems,
however, copes with these challenges by recognizing each state’s
different security in the course of pursuing global security.
A.

The Limited Scope of Liability Respects Free Expression While
Securing a Means of Increasing National and Global Security.

States and companies make decisions about what they should
prioritize every single day. When it comes to social media and
161. Thomas Wheatley, Opinion, Why Social Media is Not a Public Forum,
POST
(Aug.
4,
2017),
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-arelocal/wp/2017/08/04/why-social-media-is-not-a-publicforum/?utm_term=.fd34ed2ff099 [https://perma.cc/TP8P-SUQU].
162. Defining “terrorist speech” as “speech likely to incite violence or
recruiting others for the incitement of violence” does not implicate the
free expression of opinions or other information protected under the
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. See International Covenant,
supra note 112.
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terrorism, these decisions often hinge on how much the decision
makers value the freedom of speech in comparison to national
security. 163 Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy, Marne
Levine, addressed the balance Facebook sought to strike between
these two concerns stating:
We work hard to remove hate speech [which often includes
incitement] quickly, however there are instances of offensive
content, including distasteful humor, that are not hate speech
according to our definition. In these cases, we work to apply
fair, thoughtful, and scalable policies. This approach allows us
to continue defending the principles of freedom of self-expression
on which Facebook is founded.” 164

Germany sought to strike a different balance. With the passage of
the “Facebook law,” German lawmakers wanted to impose fines on
social media platforms which fail to remove hate speech and content
inciting violence. 165 Digital rights and free speech activists opposed the
measure, arguing the regulation overly-restricted social media
platforms. 166 Justifying the restriction, German Justice Minister Heiko
Maas stated, “[T]he ability to bring big consequences for companies
[is] necessary in combating hate speech and radicalized content
online.” 167 The tension between free speech and security raises a
question which goes to the heart of how best to respond to terrorist
speech, but also highlights the different values held by each state and
company. 168 By using the international resources of INTERPOL, but
limiting them to the national terrorist lists and specific types of
speech, states gain control over the process. This enables the state to
target only the specific groups they believe sufficiently threaten their
national security to justify a limitation on free speech.

163. Hugh Handeyside, Social Media Companies Should Decline the
Government’s Invitation to Join the National Security State, JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/28755/socialmedia-companies-decline-governments-invitation-join-national-securitystate/ [https://perma.cc/KTQ7-RRBK].
164. Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on Facebook, FACEBOOK
(May 28, 2013 4:51 PM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebooksafety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-onfacebook/574430655911054/
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B. States Maintain Control Over The System, Protecting Their
Sovereignty, Through the Integration of State Terrorist Designations and
Judicial Systems.

At any time during this process, nations can choose to completely
opt out of the system by blocking social media companies or choosing
not to prosecute. Since China gained access to the internet, the
government has censored access to certain websites. 169 With over 700
million internet users—equating to 1 in every 4 of the internet’s
population—China leads the world in e-commerce and online
activity. 170 The security of the government, however, depends on its
ability to block those websites that disrupt the Communist Party’s
narrative, while permitting the growing technological and commercial
benefits the internet facilitates. 171 States dissatisfied with the joint
enforcement plan always have the option to completely block social
media companies like China has done. Alternatively, states could
choose not to pursue prosecutions against the companies, thereby
permitting unrestricted free expression on the platforms. Hopefully,
states would not choose either option. They always have, however, a
means of protecting their national sovereignty should they believe the
concerns outweigh the benefits.
Additionally, utilizing existing INTERPOL resources has little
impact on current efforts by governments or social media companies
to stop terrorist speech. At a minimum, including INTERPOL adds a
beneficial resource rather than a challenge to sovereignty or a draw on
resources. Little, if anything, about this proposal forces social media
companies or national governments to change what they already do.
Governments may specify that the content only be taken down after
recording all usable information to trace the producers or after storing
the content for counter-propaganda purposes. While including
INTERPOL in the discussion and imposing liability would change the
incentives motivating both social media companies and aid in
allocating national resources towards prosecutions, a state does not
have to prioritize the resources if it chooses not to.
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V. Conclusion
Lacking the traditional trappings of state and country, non-state
actors have and are forcing the national security community to
rethink their responses. Following 9/11, the U.S. recognized the need
for international cooperation and collaboration in preventing future
failures in immigration, like those that permitted the 9/11 hijackers to
enter the country. 172 A similar solution is necessary to effectively
address terrorist speech on social media—a solution found in an
international aiding and abetting standard. By relying on customary
international law for the standard and using a combination of
INTERPOL and national governments for implementation,
governments can effectively reduce the threat posed by terrorist
content inciting or recruiting for violence. Through national
governments’ existing terrorist designations and the increased
monitoring by INTERPOL the political concerns in identifying
“terrorist speech” and the quantity of terrorist speech are reduced.
Subsequent removal or failure to remove such speech by the social
media companies then becomes an issue remedied through established
court systems. Uniting the strengths of international law with the
resources available in national jurisdictions resolves the need for a
comprehensive approach while simultaneously recognizing and
respecting differences nations may have regarding what constitutes
terrorism.
Nations should acknowledge the role social media companies have
come to play in society, as well as the companies’ stake in stopping
terrorism. When social media companies fail to remove known
terrorist speech, their inaction facilitates violence. Free speech and
freedom from unnecessary government interference must be balanced
against security simultaneously sought from the government. In
seeking to reduce or eliminate the corruption of free speech by nonstate actors’ liability for those companies maintaining access to the
speech should be considered.

172. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISTS ATTACKS, 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 390 (2004) (authorized ed.).
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